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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000400110001-6

4 September 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security


THROUGH : Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SUBJECT : House Select Committee Security
Procedures

1. Forwarded herewith is the original and three copies of the Memorandum for the Record which describes the security and procedural arrangements of the House Select Committee Staff offices. Both the content of the memorandum and the floor plan of Tab A were made from memory since there was little opportunity to make notes on site. If your recollection identifies any discrepancies or if you are aware of any additions which should be made, the memorandum will be adjusted accordingly.

2. A Memorandum for the Record setting forth the details of the audio countermeasures briefing and other relevant aspects dealing with Ms. Hess' visit on 2 September is in draft and will be forwarded shortly.


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Acting Chief, Physical Security Division
Office of Security

Att

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2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, Review of Security Procedures

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1. On 29 August 1975, Messrs [redacted] Robert Gambino and [redacted] visited the offices of the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the purpose of discussing the security program established for the protection of classified and codeword materials furnished to that Committee and to consider other allied security aspects bearing upon the problem. The circumstances of the visit precluded the conduct of a security survey as such. However, the opportunity to view the offices and to discourse with Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Jacqueline Hess, Committee Security Officer, provided an opportunity to obtain a general overview of the security arrangements. In general, the physical arrangements and the procedural routine established for the control of the facility and classified materials was found to be generally quite good. Ms. Hess has obviously assumed her duties as Security Officer in a serious and conscientious manner. Mr. Field indicated that he has and will continue to give her complete backing on the security program.

2. Committee offices are situated on the basement level of the Rayburn House Office Building. Tab A is a rough sketch of the office layout made from memory based upon a cursory walk-through. The floors are presumed to be constructed of poured concrete. The overhead is a drop ceiling from the concrete slab of the first floor. The peripheral walls A-B, B-C, C-D and D-E are part of the original construction of the building but are of unknown construction. They appear to be approximately 8" thick and are believed to be of regular plaster or masonry construction. According to a comment made by Ms. Hess, walls E-F and F-A are modular metal walls which appear to terminate at the level of the drop ceiling. Interior

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partitions marked "XX" on the floor plan of Tab A were recently installed specifically for Committee purposes and are standard dry wall partitions reaching from the floor slab to the drop ceiling. The rooms adjacent to walls E-F and F-A are occupied by House Judiciary Committee Staffs. Walls C-D and D-E parallel the main corridors. Wall B-C is believed to be an exterior building wall according to a remark made by Ms. Hess. (A detailed inspection of the area was deemed inappropriate as being too obtrusive.)

3. Entry to the suite of offices may be gained through Room B-316 (Door #1). Door #2, a heavy walnut door, has been equipped with a contact switch and is maintained in a secure condition. Doors #3, #4 and #5 are believed to be either hollow-core steel or wooden doors which open into the Committee offices. However, they have been secured by a triangular piece of steel across the upper corner of each. The steel plate has been secured to the steel door frame and overlaps the upper corner opposite the hinges in such fashion as to preclude it being opened. Ms. Hess indicated that she plans to have Doors #3, #4 and #5 alarmed with contact switches in the same fashion as Door #2 is presently. The file storage area is equipped with a volumetric alarm system of an unknown type. According to Ms. Hess, it was designed specifically for its present location. It annunciates at the main alarm panel for the Rayburn House Office Building and Ms. Hess believes it is equipped with a transmission line supervisory element. All door contacts, when installed, will also annunciate at the main alarm panel.

4. The entry at Door #1 (B-316) opens into an office occupied by two secretaries and a uniformed guard. Authorized personnel, i.e., members of the Staff, are admitted during duty hours on personal recognition by the guard. Anyone else must sign in with the guard and be escorted by a member of the Staff. No one other than Staff members and members of the House Select Committee are permitted unescorted access to the area beyond the room occupied by the guard and the two secretaries.

5. Staff personnel occupy the area so indicated on the floor plan. Access through Door #8 into the reading room/file storage area is permitted on a need-to-know basis, and is limited to Select Committee Staff members and Congressmen who are on the Committee. The door contains a hand-lettered

sign stating "Authorized Personnel Only." The two areas designated as file storage and reading room are actually one large room separated laterally by a row of Class 3 five-drawer security cabinets.

6. No one except the Security Officer, Ms. Hess, immediate members of her Staff, and Mr. Field are permitted into the file storage area. Items for review may be drawn by authorized personnel who place the request with the control clerk positioned at the desk just inside Door #8. The request is then given to one of Ms. Hess' Staff in the file storage area. The material is then logged out by the control clerk to the requester who must remain within the reading room for whatever review is necessary. Ms. Hess advised that no copies may be made of any documents, nor is notetaking permitted except in accordance with the provisions of the document attached hereto as Tab B. entitled "Document Security Procedures." The control clerk recovers material from those who have checked it out prior to their leaving the reading room and logs it back into the storage area.

7. The number of Class 3 five-drawer security cabinets was not determined. However, Ms. Hess indicated that all material is stored within these cabinets. It is estimated that there are 12 to 15 such containers in the file storage area. Ms. Hess advised that all combinations are maintained personally by her and no one else, not even Mr. Field. She personally changes the combinations and opens and secures the cabinets only when the need arises.

8. During all duty hours, there is one guard who is positioned just inside the main entry, Door B-316, designated as Door #1 on Tab A. During non-duty hours, there are two uniformed guards on duty in the area. An access list of authorized Staff members is furnished to the guards, and if the guards do not personally know a member of the Staff, then that member must produce the Committee Staff ID card to establish his/her bona fides. Cleaning of all offices is accomplished by the regular House Office char force, who are kept under close escort by one of the Committee Staff officers.

9. Telephones utilized in the offices are of the multiline type and are part of the regular telephone system in the building. There are no special protective devices associated with the telephone units. The threat posed by the telephones was raised by Mr. Field and he was afforded

a limited briefing on the techniques of hot-miking. It was also pointed out that the instruments themselves could furnish hiding places for transmitters. Mr. Gambino informed Mr. Field and Ms. Hess of the threat of drop-in transmitters and of the carry-in type, such as may be hidden in the heel of a shoe. In pursuit of the audio threat problem, Ms. Hess advised she has the area in question "swept" frequently and understands the need for control of furniture and other items moved into the offices. The problem of switchable transmitters was mentioned and appeared to be new information for both Ms. Hess and Mr. Field. Slight mention was made of the threat posed by electric typewriters.

10. During the discussion of the hostile audio threat, an invitation was extended to both officers to visit the Agency for an audio countermeasures briefing. Mr. Field demurred at the time, but later in the afternoon Ms. Hess called and indicated she would very much like to visit and receive the briefing. It was scheduled for 2 September.

11. Ms. Hess voluntarily mentioned her concern for an air duct which exits the suite of offices just outside the reading room. The duct runs up the wall and crosses over into an adjoining office. She mentioned the problem to the audio countermeasures team which she utilizes. It was indicated to her that the duct is baffled against sound transmission, but she was not satisfied until she ran tests and determined that audible conversations were not, in fact, passing from the Committee offices into adjoining offices. Ms. Hess further indicated that she had declined the suggestion to utilize a radio near the duct opening for the purpose of masking sound. It was pointed out to Ms. Hess that she had made an excellent decision since, when the radio is not turned on, the speaker could be utilized as a microphone, thereby constituting a hostile audio threat. Ms. Hess indicated that this aspect was unknown to her, but she had declined the use of the radio on an intuitive feeling that it might represent a problem.

12. A brief discussion was held relative to the control of sensitive and classified documents furnished to the Committee. All Agency representatives present indicated that the system adopted by Ms. Hess as set forth in Tab B of this memorandum appears to be an excellent program. However, Mr. Gambino remarked on the fact that requests emanating from the Committee which cite document titles or describe the information desired may in and of themselves

constitute classified or sensitive material and should probably be classified. Ms. Hess indicated that neither she nor the Committee has authority to classify documents. Mr. Gambino suggested that she might consider an alternative to normal classification, i.e., develop an internal control system exclusive for Committee use, which will utilize a stamped or typed annotation on each document which would alert recipients and members of the Staff to the sensitivity of the content of such documents. This would afford a modicum of control without violating any statutory or executive issuances relative to classification. Ms. Hess agreed to consider such an arrangement.

13. Ms. Hess indicated that in accordance with their rules of procedure, no documents may be copied without the written permission of Mr. Field, the Staff Director, but in the event that such is done, the copies would be properly classified and entered into her control system.

14. It was suggested to Ms. Hess that, if a compromise should occur, the Agency would very much appreciate being alerted in the shortest possible time. It was explained that prompt notification of a suspected compromise would facilitate the conduct of a damage assessment. Ms. Hess indicated complete understanding of this concept.


15. Both Ms. Hess and Mr. Field indicated that they have no reason to doubt the devotion and loyalty of any of their Staff employees, but that they both maintain a healthy concern and vigilance for any possible leak of information to unauthorized persons. Mr. Field volunteered that because of the crowded conditions in the offices, he had considered the installation of some sort of privacy booth around the telephones. He decided against such an arrangement, however, and plans to keep two people in each office to offset the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information over the telephone. He explained his feeling that the presence of a second Staff member would tend to discourage another from intentionally or inadvertently conversing on matters of great sensitivity while on the telephone.

16. Near the end of the visit, Mr. Field voluntarily expressed some concern relative to the delivery of classified material to him by an Agency courier. He related that recently, one of the Agency couriers came to the Staff offices with material which he, the courier, had been directed to deliver only to Mr. Field. The latter was not present in the office when the courier arrived, but

he, the courier, was advised that Mr. Field had gone to the nearby snack bar. The courier proceeded to the snack bar and inquired of one of the customers if he knew Mr. Field. The customer indicated that he knew Mr. Field and pointed him out to the courier. The courier then queried Mr. Field if he were, in fact, Mr. Field. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, the courier handed the material to Mr. Field and received a scribbled initial on the courier receipt and departed. Mr. Gambino indicated that he shared fully Mr. Field's concern over this matter and agreed to pursue it further. It was agreed that in the future, materials should be delivered only to Ms. Hess or Mr. Field by couriers who either know them or who will establish their bona fides by their ID cards.

17. Mr. Gambino raised the question with Mr. Field relative to the secure handling of transcripts of testimony taken in closed session. Mr. Field was advised that there is a long-standing procedure which is activated whenever the Director, Mr. Colby, testifies, but there is no program at the moment for other Agency personnel who may testify in closed session. Mr. Gambino described in brief the procedure followed in controlling stenographic notes and transcripts relative to Mr. Colby's testimony. Mr. Field advised that he is not knowledgeable of any system which may have been established by the House Select Committee but will look into the matter. (Mr. Gambino advised the undersigned to contact Ms. Hess in a week or two on this matter.)

18. The visit was concluded on a most amiable note. It was agreed that the exchange of appropriate information on security matters of mutual concern to Mr. Field and Ms. Hess and the Agency should continue on a cooperative and informal basis. The invitation for Ms. Hess and Mr. Field to visit the Agency for an audio countermeasures briefing was reiterated.


Deputy Chief, Physical Security Division


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HOLIE SENATE
COMMITTEE
STAFF OFFICE
PAYROLL STAFF

SCALE: 1000
27 AUGUST 1975

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